Semi-fragile watermarking can be used to detect illegal and local manipulation of images, while being robust towards legal manipulations such as lossy compression. This paper describes a gametheoretic approach to design a blind semi-fragile watermarking system based on the Scalar Costa Scheme. A natural choice for the game criterion is a false alarm probability, i.e. the probability to still detect the watermark, even if part of the data has been replaced. Optimal embedding strategy is then derived in presence of a legal processing (e.g. lossy compression, through some model). Finally, the results are applied to design an efficient DCT semifragile watermarking system which allows to detect local forgery signals in spite of JPEG compression.
INTRODUCTION
The ease of editing multimedia contents has raised up the need of integrity check. Rather than making use of digital signature-based systems which generally do not allow any legitimate manipulations (such as lossy compression, D/A and A/D conversions, filtering), we consider semi-fragile watermarking. The watermark is designed on one side to survive legal processings which do not alter the semantic content of the image, and on the other side to be fragile to local forgeries of data. Clearly, semi-fragile watermarking is only part of a full authentication process since content integrity check additionally requires security assessments. Among the proposed semi-fragile algorithms [1] , Eggers and al. [2] were the first to propose a scheme based on the Scalar Costa Scheme (SCS). This technique has at least two advantages: (i) it cancels the host signal interference and thus may ensure performance independence towards forgery and (ii) embedding capacity under distortion constraint is close to the achievable upper-bound, providing good localization of non-authentic regions. For these reasons, we have chosen this technique as a basis for our semi-fragile watermarking study. Our contribution is to propose an accurate performance study, as well as an optimal tuning of the system through Game theory.
Game theory has been efficiently introduced to formalize the natural competition between the information hider and the attacker and to derive optimal embedding and attack strategies. Contrary to the robust watermarking literature, performance bounds of semifragile techniques have surprisingly seldom been theoretically investigated. In the "one bit watermarking" issue [3] , the goal of the detector is to distinguish a host signal where a watermark has been embedded from the initial host signal. It has been proven that the Costa approach largely outperforms classical spread-spectrum embedding since it rejects host content interference. In [4, 5] , the criterion of interest involved in the game is the total probability of error of not detecting correctly the presence of the watermark, i.e. half the probability of not detecting the watermark whereas it is actually embedded (miss probability) plus half the probability of detecting the watermark despite of it is not present yet (falsealarm probability). However, the considered problem is not well adapted to authentication-like problems: the watermarker mainly wants to detect the largest number of forgeries in the watermarked and legally processed image, for a given detection probability. This paper is organized as follow. Sect.2 describes the considered watermarking scheme, while Sect.3 addresses a general formulation of our semi-fragile game. Its resolution is provided in Sect.4 where optimal watermark tunings are then derived. This general study is applied Sect.5 to design a DCT domain semifragile optimal algorithm which is robust to JPEG compression.
CONTEXT AND WATERMARKING SCHEME
Given a "legal" image processing (e.g. lossy compression), we consider the situation where, somewhere in the image, an attacker replaces part of the original watermarked and legally processed data by his own forged signal. In order to localize this tampering region without any access to the original host image (blind watermarking), the image has been block watermarked using a private key K shared by the watermarker and the decoder. Each of these blocks are so-called analysis regions and have a surface of Na × Na pixels. The watermark should have a sufficiently small energy to imply negligible perceptual degradations.
Subchannel Watermarking Scheme
Assume that the watermark detection process is undertaken separately for each block of Na × Na pixels. Let I be the original content of this region (cf. Fig.1 ). I is then decomposed into small blocks of size M × M , which are processed by an orthogonal transform T . Suppose that I contains exactly N of those small blocks. Among the M 2 "channels" provided by the transform, one chooses K subchannels, which will potentially carry the watermark, according to some criteria (e.g. visibility, high resolution, etc.). Finally, the watermark is embedded in each subchannel by the Scalar Costa Scheme [6] (embedding the all-zero code-word). Assume that some legal processing V then causes mild degradations in each subchannels. V models legal image manipulations such as lossy compression. The watermarked and legally processed content Iw of this current analysis region is obtained by applying inverse transform T −1 . Then, knowing the private key, the detector d has to discriminate Iw (corresponding to hypothesis H1) versus I subst (corresponding to hypothesis H0) forged by a malicious user. n denote the n th sample of the k th output of the transform when analysing the block I. There are N such values for each k, which are grouped into vectors
[ N modulates this embedding. A watermarked signal x (k) is produced. This signal is degraded by a zero mean additive noise v (k) , of variance σ 2 v (k) , modeling degradation V . The resulting signal is denoted by r (k) and is publicly available. Finally, the SCS decoder computes y Define respectively the Watermark-to-Noise and the Signal-toNoise linear power Ratios in the k th subchannel by wnr
We assume in the sequel that the watermark and the legal alteration have much smaller variances than the signal: ∀k, σ
We then introduce parameters relating to SCS watermarking as originally defined in [6] : α (k) is the scaling factor and ∆ (k) is the step of the quantization cell. We recall the SCS embedding/decoding processings which are respectively
where mod∆ (.) is the quantization error induced by a uniform scalar quantizer with step ∆.
GAME-THEORETIC FORMULATIONS OF OUR SEMI-FRAGILE WATERMARKING PROBLEM

Initial Formulation of the Game
Given a signal y, detector d performs as proposed in [2] a Bayesian-test to decide which of hypotheses H0 or H1 is most likely. For a given detection threshold τ , the decision rule is
where
is the log-likelihood of observation y. It has been assumed that T makes the K subchannels independent. We respectively introduce the false-alarm probability P f a and the detection probability
The respective goals of watermarker and attacker are exactly opposed: the watermarker tunes the system in such a way that the probability of not detecting a forgery is minimized. Conversely, the attacker aims at performing image falsifications that cannot be detected by the watermarker. Thus, we formulate our first semifragile watermarking model as the following generic constrained minmax problem:
where P0 is a target detection probability after legal processing and w
. For an authentication system to be reliable, P0 should be close to 1. Dw is the per-watermarked sample mean distortion tolerance level which ensures the invisibility of the watermark. Variables and sets involved in the minmax problem for the watermarker and attacker are not specified yet. It will be done during the argumentation.
A More Precise Formulation of the Game
We again focus on the k th subchannel and we give in this section a model of detection signal pdf's under both hypotheses, leading to an explicit formulation of the game.
• Under H0: We suppose that the forged signal has any statistics but remains statistically independent of K. In other words, the forgery operation is a substitution with any unmarked content. In fact, this assumption is restrictive in terms of security (there could be better strategies) and this point will be addressed in further works concentrating on security aspects. Nevertheless, the perspective of this paper is to assess the achievable performances for semi-fragile watermarking purposes using a provably good watermarking method. Thus, the dither key quantization process (1) 
. This result ensures [7] that there is no strategy for the attacker to build an unmarked content which would produce detection signals with non-flat pdf's. This point implies that game (5) reduces to
where the attacker influence has vanished. This SCS property ensures that algorithm performances will be independent of the chosen unmarked forgery signal.
• Under H1: Without any alteration V , detection signal y
is well known to be uniform over the restricted
Thus, in presence of typical centered additive unimodal noises V (gaussian, laplacian, etc.) and for not too small wnr (k) , the pdf of y (k) n can be roughly viewed as the convolution of a uniform distribution and an unimodal distribution. Hence, the result is also unimodal. Therefore, we model it by a centered normal distribution with variance σ 2 y (k) . Choosing this model provides a generic approach. However, its accuracy should be practically assessed regarding to the chosen alterationV . Note that this analysis still makes sense for uniform noises since the resulting pdf's are trapezoidal. Conversely, a very small wnr (k) implies y (k) n to be uniform and gaussian modeling would lead to mismatch. If ever the wnr of some subchannels are too small, we exclude them from the watermarked subchannels set since they would anyway not contribute efficiently to the likelihood test. It can be shown that, for not too small wnr (k) , variance σ 2 y (k) is fairly approximated by
4. GAME RESOLUTION
Expression of P f a
According to latter modelings, (3) can be expressed as
. (8) (8) implies that l(y) is a sum of KN independent random variables and thus can be modeled as a normal distribution by the Central Limit Theorem (CLT). Thus, (4) shows that P f a and P d equals the probability that a gaussian process exceeds a given threshold. Taking into account the constraint P d ≥ P0, straightforward computations yield
where δ = 6
is relied to a measure of the amount of watermark with respect to the amount of noise in the k th subchannel. (9) will be optimized with respect to the λ (k) 's. We now express the relation between λ (k) and the quantity of interest wnr (k) . Our goal here is to find the best assignment of watermark among the various subchannels so as to maximize the performances. Thus, the SCS parameters α (k) et ∆ (k) are chosen according to [2] so as to maximize the discrimination
Then, combining the last two relations, the definition of λ (k) and equation (7), the invertible relation between λ (k) and wnr (k) is
Reformulation of the Embedding Distortion Constraint
As stated in game (5), mean embedding distortion constraint is
which can be expressed in terms of λ (k) 's using (10). Unfortunately, (9) is hard to be numerically minimized under constraint (11) due to non-differentiability of λ (k) for wnr (k) = 0. To avoid this problem, we use the (differentiable) asymptotical expansion of (10) which leads to λ (k) ≈ 12 wnr (k) + c0 where c0 ≈ 10.49. Substituting this last approximation into (11), the power constraint of (5) takes the linear form:
Dw where
. This last constraint has been used to minimize (9).
Final Form of the Game
Finally, for given N , K, P0, Dw,¨σ
and since Q is decreasing, game (6) can be rewritten as
The left part of second constraint is required because of the positivity of wnr (k) . The right part is equivalent to 10 σ
This optimization is performed numerically. Optimal distribution {wnr (k) } k is then obtained by wnr (k) = (λ (k) − c0)/12.
PRACTICAL IMPLEMENTATION
A DCT Semi-Fragile Watermarking Scheme Robust to JPEG Compression
We illustrate the latter study on the grayscale image Lena (512 × 512). Our goal is to allow JPEG compression with a quality factor of 70% (i.e. V ≡ JP EG) and still be able to detect local data replacements. The watermark is embedded in the DCT domain (i.e. T ≡ DCT Transform). Each (square) analysis region of size 8
is decomposed into 64 frequency subchannels indexed by the zig-zag scan. V is then a quantizer with JPEG step q (k) in each subchannel k. In addition, we require the High Resolution regime to ensure that V introduces additive centered uniform noises. Pdf modeling under H1 stated Sect.3.2 is then fulfilled. Thus, the watermarked subchannels sub-set is composed of the subchannels for which the relation
The DC coefficient is not altered to avoid block artifacts. On the Lena image, 23 subchannels are to be watermarked (K = 23). It turns out that optimal distributions may be interpreted as a waterfillinglike repartition. The first watermarked components are the ones which have the lowest JPEG variances, i.e. low frequencies. The watermark is spreaded over higher frequencies as Dw increases. Using realistic parameters and whatever the image, the optimization leads systematically to distributions {wnr (k) } k which only contains zero terms (i.e. non-watermarked components) and terms greater than 1. For the latter ones, approximation (7) holds. As for the former ones, non-watermarked components are excluded from the watermarked subchannels sub-set and K is reduced.
Achievable Performances
We present in this section typical achievable P f a in function of parameters N , P0 et Dw. Dw is chosen so that the PSNR just after the watermarking process equals 43 dB. The optimization n is extracted from real data) and full modeled (i.e. P r(y (k) n |H1) is approximated by a normal distribution and l(y) is statistically modeled by the CLT). Real statistics have been evaluated on a set of 1500 natural images.
Given the optimal distribution {wnr (k) } k , performances are evaluated by (9). Setting P0 = 1 − 10 −5 , we found P f a = 5.9 × 10 −2 for N = 1 and P f a = 3.6 × 10 −5 for N = 4. Thus, the detection of the substitution of a 16 × 16 analysis region is reliable. As evaluating in [1] (with P0 = 1 − 2 × 10 −3 , N = 1, PSNR = 41dB, on 10 images 512 × 512), Eggers' method performs an experimental P f a of 2.5 × 10 −1 . In the same conditions, our scheme performs a experimental P f a of 5.2 × 10 −3 , illustrating the increase of performance obtained by using optimal tunings.
Experimental Detection of Replaced Regions
The Lena image is watermarked (N = 1, PSNR = 43dB et P0 = 1 − 10 −4 ) and JPEG compressed (quality factor of 70 %). Two kinds of alterations were produced: (i) the lower left corner of the watermarked and JPEG compressed image (a 128 × 128 block) was substituted by the corresponding original image content, (ii) a 16 pixels diameter black circle tampered the hat. Results are illustrated on Fig.4 .
CONCLUSIONS
We have presented a game-theoretic study of a semi-fragile watermarking algorithm based on the SCS. The aim is to perform detection of local unmarked forgeries in the image, in presence of legal processings. Given a watermarking domain and a legal additive processing, we then derived the optimal embedding strategy. A DCT watermark detection example robust to JPEG compression has been given, demonstrating that practical implementations of the algorithm are feasible. The presented game model has not taken into account how the position of the forgery region could impact the performance of the replacement detection. This has been avoided by assuming that the forgery region exactly overlaps an analysis region. This study is available, and will be reported.
